Raastah

Baba, I am scared

noreply@blogger.com (-Musaafir) — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 14:23:00 +0000

Baba, I am scared...

Baba,

My teacher informs me

All children to remain

At home, and study there!

Baba

I have heard

A monster of a man

With black moustache

Will explode the bomb here

All children will die!!

Baba,

Why are they going to kill us?

What is our mistake?

Why angry they are with us?

Baba,

Shall I give him my doll?

Or all my rainbow colours from the blue box

The one I received from you, the present

On my last birthday

Or my hair band, the beautiful one

Imbued in red, with butterflies

Shall I give him that one as well!

Will that be enough for this man?

Not to kill us

Remember Baba, my hands,

The old injury, once

The excruciating pain

As little blood flowed through

Torrents of rain in my eyes

What is this bomb like?

Will the damage be huge?

Will it hurt more?

I guess the pain will be more

Baba, will I be there to cry for

My own pain or will you?

Baba, fearful I am of this monster!

By: Atif Javaid Atif

Translation: Kashkin

Poem image and translation reproduced here with permission: Kashkin
Picture of victim of a terrorist attack at a market in Pakistan: AP/K.M. Chaudary

Security FAIL!

noreply@blogger.com (-Musaafir) — Mon, 07 Dec 2009 11:00:00 +0000

Why racial profiling fails?

In July of this year a Harvard University professor and eminent black scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. was arrested by a white police officer for trying to enter into his own house in Cambridge Massachusetts. A great debate ensued that incident and eventually even president Obama was caught in the controversy when he --in a moment of unguarded candor-- uttered a sentence of support for his friend professor Gates at a press conference. All hell broke loose as the American press, as expected, picked up the story of such great 'national interest', and it was a media circus for a few days where professor Gates and Obama's quote was repeated again and again. Eventually Obama had to defuse the situation by inviting the good professor and the arresting officer to the white house for a so called 'Beer Summit'. Read the full story here.

More recently there was an utter failure of racial profiling. This happened at, of all the places in the world, at the most securest of them all, --the White House in Washington. The occasion was the state dinner hosted by the US president in honor of the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his entourage. Background checks were performed on all guests even before they were put on the guest list. As anyone can imagine all the 800+ people on the guest list including the diplomats, dignitaries, and other VIPs had to go through a number of checks before they were allowed to get even in the same room as the president and the Indian prime minister.

However, apparently all that security was not enough as everyone and their babysitter found out, from, of all places the 'Facebook' website, where a couple posted their pictures with the US resident Obama, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the vice president Joe Biden, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and even a bunch of beaming US Marines in their smart ceremonial uniforms. There was nothing wrong with the pictures however, what the problem was that Mr. and Mrs. Tareq Salahi were not on the guest list, they didn't have an invitation, in short, they were the party crashers at nothing less than the state dinner in Washington, DC.

So, why does racial profiling mostly fail? Because in today's post 9/11 world, everyone is looking for dark-skinned-bearded-wild-eyed-middle-eastern-looking people. What they wear does not matter, as was evident in the case of the White House party crashers, where Mrs. Salahi was wearing an Indian bright red dress with traditional Indian/Pakistani bangles. While the Secret Service was busy looking for such middle eastern looking people, the Salahis had no trouble literally waltzing into the White House.

This also made me wonder, if the Birthers have doubts about president Obama's constitutional eligibility to be the president of the United States, they should know that in America, where the local police doesn't even let a black man enter his own house (professor Gates), how could the Secret Service let a non-citizen into the White House? But then again, I guess President Barack Hussein Obama II doesn't look Middle Eastern.

There is no winning in Afghanistan

noreply@blogger.com (-Musaafir) — Sat, 14 Nov 2009 18:26:00 +0000

Why are we there?

That is the question someone asked recently. Not someone who has never been to Afghanistan but someone who was in the midst of it all and saw what is going on there first hand, someone who was representing the official U.S. policy in Afghanistan. It is a good question, however can someone in the United States answer this very good question?

When a person graduates from a prestigious private research university like Tufts, that boasts the oldest graduate school of international relations in the United States, you expect the person to know more about international politics and relations between countries than the regular Joe on the street. Add to that, a mix of combat experience in the battlefield with the U.S. Marines and at the Department of Defense with the U.S. Army and you get a good handle on what is going on abroad.

The most logical career path for such a graduate would be to join the State Department as a career officer. However, being the idealist he is, he wants to make a difference and decides to to serve his country by joining the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps. He then spends some time in the U.S. Army and serves in Iraq as a commander of a combat engineering company as a Marine reservist.

This person is Capt. Matthew P. Hoh, the poster child of the U.S. foreign service. A bright and educated young man with the unique combination of combat experience as well as an insight into the international politics. So how does someone who is educated and dedicated and has all the relative experience and the energy and drive to do wonders for his country get disillusioned in just 5 months of his tenure in Afghanistan? Makes you wonder exactly what the heck is going on there? He became the first U.S.official to resign in protest against the U.S. policies there. His resignation letter of September 10th has sent shock waves all the way up to the White House.

I will not speculate on what motivated him to end his promising career, as Capt. Hoh has so succinctly put it in his resignation letter. As I read the letter of resignation, I could feel that it was written more in sorrow than as an angry rebuke. Another startling thing Matthew mentions in his interview below is that the sentiments expressed in his letter are not just his alone but are shared by most of the military personnel in Afghanistan.

It is a good read and I urge you to read it to get an understanding of what is going on across our porous and sometimes non-existent border to the west, and as a result how it is affecting each and every one in Pakistan on a daily basis. The letter was so critical and damning for the U.S. policy in Afghanistan that Richard Holbrooke, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, invited Matthew to his office to convince him to reconsider his decision and take back his resignation, and indeed he was successful initially and Matthew decided to stay on, however he finally resigned just a week later.

Ambassador Nancy J. Powell
Director General of the Foreign Service and
Director of Human Resources
U.S. Department of State
2201 C. Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ambassador Powell:

It is with great regret and disappointment I submit my resignation from my appointment as a Political Officer in the Foreign Service and my post as the Senior Civilian Representative for the U.S. Government in Zabul Province. I have served six of the previous ten years in service to our country overseas, to include deployment as a U.S. Marine officer and Department of Defense civilian in the Euphrates and Tigris River Valleys of Iraq in 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. I did not enter into this position lightly or with any undue expectations nor did I believe my assignment would be without sacrifice, hardship or difficulty. However, in the course of my five months of service in Afghanistan, in both Regional Commands East and South, I have lost understanding of and confidence in the strategic purposes of the United States' presence in Afghanistan. I have doubts and reservations about our current strategy and planned future strategy, but my resignation is based not upon how we are pursuing this war, but why and to what end. To put simply: I fail to see the value or the worth in continued U.S. casualties or expenditures of resources in support of the Afghan government in what is, truly, a 35-year old civil war.

This fall will mark the eighth year of U.S. combat, governance and development operations within Afghanistan. Next fall, the United States' occupation will equal in length the Soviet Union's own physical involvement in Afghanistan. Like the Soviets, we continue to secure and bolster a failing state, while encouraging an ideology and system of government unknown and unwanted by its people.
If the history of Afghanistan is one great stage play, the United States is no more than a supporting actor, among several previously, in a tragedy that not only pits tribes, valleys, clans, villages and families against one another, but, from at least the end of King Zahir Shah's reign, has violently and savagely pitted the urban, secular, educated and modern of Afghanistan against the rural, religious, illiterate and traditional. It is this latter group that composes and supports the Pashtun insurgency. The Pashtun insurgency, which is composed of multiple, seemingly infinite, local groups, is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies. The U.S. and NATO presence and operations in Pashtun valleys and villages, as well as Afghan army and police unites that are led and composed of non-Pashtun soldiers and police, provide an occupation force against which the insurgency is justified. In both RC East and South, I have observed that the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.
The United States military presence in Afghanistan greatly contributes to the legitimacy and strategic message of the Pashtun insurgency. In a like manner our backing of the Afghan government in its current form continues to distance the government from the people. The Afghan government's failings particularly when weighed against the sacrifice of American lives and dollars, appear legion and metastatic:

Glaring corruption and unabashed graft;
President whose confidants and chief advisers comprise drug lords and war crimes villains, who mock our own rule of law and counternarcotics efforts;
A system of prvincial and district leaders constituted of local power brokers, opportunists and strongmen allied to the United States solely for, and limited by, the value of our USAID and CERP contracts and whose own political and economic interests stand nothing to gain from any positive or genuine attempts at reconciliation; and
The recent election process dominated by fraud and discredited by low voter turnout, which has created an enormous victory for our enemy who now claims a popular boycott and will call into question worldwide our government's military, economic and diplomatic support for an invalid and illegitimate Afghan government.

Our support for this kind of government, coupled with a misunderstanding of the insurgency's true nature, reminds me horribly of our involvement with South Vietnam; an unpopular and corrupt government we backed at the expense of our Nation's own internal peace, against an insurgency whose nationalism we arrogantly and ignorantly mistook as a rival to our own Cold War ideology.

I find specious the reasons we ask for bloodshed and sacrifice from our young men and women in Afghanistan. If honest, our stated strategy of securing Afghanistan to prevent al-Qaeda resurgence or regrouping would require us to additionally invade and occupy western Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, etc. Our presence in Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in Pakistan where we rightly fear a toppled or weakened Pakistani government may lose control of its nuclear weapons. However, again, to follow the logic of our stated goals we should garrison Pakistan, not Afghanistan. More so, the September 11th attacks, as well as the Madrid and London bombings, were primarily planned and organized in Western Europe; a point that highlights the threat is not one tied to traditional geographic or political boundaries. Finally, if our concern is for a failed state crippled by corruption and poverty and under assault from criminal and drug lords, then if we bear our military and financial contributions to Afghanistan, we must reevaluate and increase our commitment to and involvement in Mexico.

Eight years into war, no nation has ever known as more dedicated, well trained, experienced and disciplined military as the U.S. Armed Forces. I do not believe any military force has ever been tasked with such a complex, opaque and Sisyphean mission as the U.S. Military has received in Afghanistan. The tactical proficiency and performance of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines is unmatched and unquestioned. However, this is not the European or Pacific theaters of World War II, but rather is a war for which our leaders, uniformed civilian and elected, have inadequately prepared and resourced our men and women. Our forces, devoted and faithful, have been committed to conflict in an indefinite and unplanned manner that has become a cavalier, politically expedient and Pollyannaish misadventure. Similarly, the United State has a dedicated and talented cadre of civilians, both U.S. government employees and contractors, who believe in and sacrifice for their mission, but have been ineffectually trained and led with guidance and intent shaped more by the political climate in Washington, D.C. than in Afghan cities, villages, mountains and valleys.
"We are spending oursleves into oblivion" a very talented and intelligent commander, one of America's best, briefs every visitor, staff delegation and senior officer. We are mortgaging our Nation's economy on a war, which, even with increased commitment, will remain a draw for years to come. Success and victory, whatever they may be, will be realized not in years, after billions more spent, but in decades and generations. The United States does not enjoy a national treasury for such success and victory.

I realize the emotion and tone of my letter and ask you excuse any ill temper. I trust you understand the nature of this war and the sacrifices made by so many thousands of families who have been separated from loved ones deployed in defense of our Nation and whose homes bear the fractures, upheavals and scars of multiple and compounded deployments. Thousands of our men and women have returned home with physical and mental wounds, some that will never heal or will only worsen with time. The dead return only in bodily form to be received by families who must be reassured their dead haves sacrificed for a purpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept. I have lost confidence such assurances can anymore be made. As such, I submit my resignation.

Sincerely,

MATTHEW P. HOH
Senior Civilian Representative
Zabul Province, Afghanistan

Source of letter:Washington Post

You can see an actual image of the letter here.

Also see a TV interview that appeard on PBS below.

Uncles Kerry and Lugar

noreply@blogger.com (-Musaafir) — Mon, 19 Oct 2009 03:30:00 +0000

Sacrificial lamb, to eat, or not to eat?

Someone sent me a link to a letter published in 'The News' a few days ago. It seemed like the chain emails one sees floating around Christmas time about the spirit of Christmas and the tradition of giving and sharing. This one seemed like the same sort about the early Christmas gift from the two uncles of the people of Pakistan, namely Uncle Kerry and Uncle Lugar. You can read the article here.

I went through the well meaning article with some amusement. The writer has tried to reason with the seemingly unreasonable people of Pakistan and pleaded with them passionately to not look a gift horse in the mouth. However, like the proverbial road to hell, paved with good intentions, this write-up seems like a half baked attempt at putting lipstick on the ugliest pig of the farm. With due respect to Shakir Husain, it seems like he doesn't even understand the difference between the concept and spirit of exchanging meat of sacrifice with his neighbor or a friend around Eid-Ul-Adha, and the cold reality of a business deal like the Kerry-Lugar bill. This bill is not some form of charity that is being handed out to Pakistan. It is payment for a service that Pakistan is expected to perform to further the interests of the US in the region. Kerry and/or Lugar, even though representing uncle Sam in this endeavor, are not the mamay (uncles) of the Pakistani people, and hence do not have the best interest of Pakistanis in their caring hearts. They have devised a deal which is a payment for the blood and tears, the people of Pakistan are spilling for America's strategic interests. Nothing less and nothing more.

Given what it is, and not going into the nitty gritty details of the deal, overall this stance by both sides is completely understandable and considering this business as usual, both sides are, and should, haggle over the price and the services that are to be delivered in return. That is exactly what is going on right now. The only difference is that this is the first time Pakistan has haggled over the price of the goods being asked for and I think this is good for business overall. Zia made the mistake of not negotiating a good enough price for standing in front of the Soviet bear frothing at the mouth at our western border. The result was a devastated economy, introduction of Kalashnikov and drug culture and the biggest played-with-and-discarded gifts for Pakistan were the trained guerrillas (whom Dan Rather, at the time, while wearing the famous Pashtun Pakol so fondly called the Mujahiddin) with their weapons --and training mind you, who suddenly found themselves out of a job. These chickens had nowhere to go except came back home to roost. Almost two decades or so later, Musharraf made the same mistake and buckled under Bush's threat to side with the US in this never ending Global War On Terror without negotiating a better deal. Wise people had said it even then, that Mushy had sold Pakistan for a paltry sum. Pakistan army's stance now is that a country that spends $1 Billion a day on it's two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and can spend $20 Billion to replace a couple of helicopters (to be used exclusively by the president) to fly between the white house and Andrews AFB --a distance of less than 10 miles, should not and cannot expect to buy a country of such strategic importance like Pakistan for a paltry sum of $7 Billion over several years. Pakistan is the front line ally in America's GWOT and yet compared to other recipients of US aid, like for example, Israel ($2.8 Billion per year) and Egypt ($1.8 Billion per year), Jordan, Colombia etc etc, which don't do much, other than to create headaches for the US, Pakistan is expected to bring home the proverbial bacon for pennies.

This time around the Pakistan army has wizened up a little and is asking for a better deal before they sign off on it. That's all. If the US was really so concerned for the future of people of Pakistan, they would do something about the rampant inflation, the rising cost of living, and the lack of electricity that is needed to run the industry. Bring a power plant on a ship to the shore of Karachi and supply electricity to the industries that are shut down in the industrial sector. Rebuild the silk weaving factories in the tribal belt which had replaced the gun factories of past. That will be a visible gesture which will create more goodwill for the US than billions upon billions in 'aid' that will invariably go towards maintaining the luxurious lifestyles of our leaders.

If my neighbor sends me some sacrificial meat on Eid-ul-Adha along with a note with stipulations that I can only cook this meat a certain way and at a certain time and how and who can eat it, then I would not even debate the issue, I would send it back with a note saying "Thanks, but no thanks".

The Miscreants From Malakand

noreply@blogger.com (-Musaafir) — Fri, 17 Jul 2009 02:00:00 +0000

Re-branding of an enemy

I find it amusing when sometimes a single word, phrase or even a sight brings back memories from a distant past. Recently I was re-introduced to an old word after an absence of a couple of decades. The last time I heard this term was when my 2nd grade teacher was scolding one of my classmates, who had been caught sticking chewing gum to the chair seats of other unsuspecting students in the class. Lately this term is being employed to describe the armed militants in the once idyllic and peaceful valley of Swat. Looking back now, I am having a hard time in somehow linking the two with each other. The little mischievous 2nd grade kids of my yesteryears, even though little terrorists in their own right could hardly pass for the cold-blooded murderers of the Swat valley today, also known as the Taliban of Pakistan (TTP). There is no comparison, by any stretch of imagination.

This brings me to my current state of puzzlement. Why are these terrorists and murderers being placed in the same category as the 6 year old gum-chewing-and-sticking-to-seats brats?

I have looked and asked around but have been unable to get a satisfactory answer to this enigma of sorts. However, I am not alone in this quandary. BBC's correspondent, Barbara Plett, who had spent the last 4 years in Pakistan, covering the recent conflict was equally confused on the subject. She noted that most of the Pakistanis she has met speak excellent English, and also admitted that some speak it even better than her. However when she tried to explain to an official spokesman for the Pakistan government that the term 'Miscreants' is used to describe a villain or a bully which is a far cry from the armed and ruthless militants waging untold misery on the local population, she was met with a polite rebuff.

Is this a re-branding of an old product, or is this the marketing of an entirely new merchandize? Is it to differentiate between the old and proven, and the new and improved? Or is it to safeguard a known commodity from irreparable damage, which was at one time, a best seller? Like major corporations, all modern armed forces have their own public relation apparatus. This PR machine is used not just to inform, but also to tout the achievements, assets and future forecasts of the army as a whole. Pakistan army's PR machine, Inter Services Public Relations or ISPR, is one such entity. Major general Athar Abbas has conducted countless press briefings and sat on many interviews, and consistently has referred to these TTP militants as the 'Miscreants'. When I watch the senior army officers on TV talk shows and current affairs programs, they all address the TTP terrorists as the 'Miscreants' as if quoting from an official memo circulated throughout the ranks of the army officer's corps. Why this change? Why discard the use of the old and commonly used moniker of the 'Pakistani Taliban'? At first I thought I had missed out on some new development or was there a concerted effort to add to the limited and well used vocabulary of the army officers. But when I failed to detect any trace of sarcasm in the statements, the only plausible explanation was the intentional and institutionalized re-branding of the TTP by the Pakistani establishment.

It seems that the army in general and the intelligence community in particular wants to make a distinction between the so-called 'Good Taliban' and the 'Bad Taliban'. To further this agenda, by calling them the 'Miscreants' the goal is to wean the public away from the phrase 'Taliban' altogether and marginalize these militants into a form of petty thugs and criminals. In some respects this could prove to be a good move but the important question is will the ISPR be able to carry out this PR coup effectively?

While any PR campaign can fizzle out and fail to achieve the desired results, sometimes due to poor planning, sometimes due to bad timing, and yet sometimes due to bad research. I have faith in the army's PR arm to successfully accomplish this change of labels. My biggest concern however, is that this strategy could backfire just as well. There is a real danger that this might, in a way soften the ruthless and cold-blooded-murdering image of the TTP. The hard-line image that the TTP has worked so hard to establish for itself, as an intolerant and barbaric entity accomplished by back to back PR disasters, took a long time to accomplish. One after another, these PR catastrophes, which included the video of the public thrashing meted out to the little girl in the street of a Swat village, summary execution video of a couple accused of adultery, and the gruesome videos of beheadings of civilians and army soldiers, have exposed the TTP for what it truly is, a bunch of radical terrorists.

I have no doubt in my mind that the Pakistan army can and will defeat these criminals. Whatever the reasons for the changing of the label, be they cosmetic or strategic, the army must ride the high tide of public support against the TTP and not become an unintentional party to the softening of the TTP’s ruthless image. This must not happen at any cost and the media in general and the ISPR in particular must understand that it is equally important to win the PR war as it is necessary to win the military side of the conflict.

Revenge of the Pashtun?

noreply@blogger.com (-Musaafir) — Mon, 15 Jun 2009 16:29:00 +0000

Destroying Pakistan to Make It Safe!!

The big headline seems more like the title for the next summer blockbuster movie, however I am not making this statement just because of the absurdity of the title but also because of the fictitious nature of the content of the article itself (you can read it here).

I read the above article by Mr. Eric Margolis recently. Eric Margolis is no stranger to the readers of the Dawn newspaper, where some of his columns have appeared. I had read Mr. Margolis in the past and generally understood what he had to say, that is, in the past. He has been around for some time now and according to him, he has spent considerable time with the Pashtuns, however I don't think he has understood the Pashtun mind and aspirations very well still and this time he has missed the mark, by a wide margin. I will not go so far as to accuse him of deliberately maligning the Pashtuns or the Pakistan army, or of romanticizing the Pashtun culture, however I will say this, even being in close proximity to the Pashtuns for all these years he has failed to understand how today's Pashtun thinks and looks to his own future. Especially when equating it with the future of his immediate surroundings and the rest of the country.

This article lays bare the writer's ignorance at best and his malice towards the Pakistan army at its worst. I am not a huge fan of the later, let me assure you, but still the narrative needs to reflect the reality that is taking place in Pakistan these days.

I do not profess to speak for all Pashtuns but I can tell you that what I say is the thought of the majority of people who call themselves Pashtuns, weather living in the confines of NWFP or outside. I will try to dispel some misconceptions here.

Pressure from Washington
The first one is the insistence of every so-called consultant, adviser, analyst and/or expert on Pakistan that the Pakistan army bowed to pressure from Washington to go after the so-called 'Taliban'. Various reasons are given for the timing and scale of the operation, the most prominent of them is the threat from Washington of cutting off financial aid to Pakistan. The second one is that the army realized the Taliban have somehow 'suddenly' become an 'existential' threat -to borrow a term from the madam secretary of state. Or the fact that the army suddenly realized that the Taliban could take over Islamabad. No one wants to even hint at the possibility that the army took this step when the public opinion turned against the Taliban, and that happened after the Tehrik-Taliban of Pakistan's (TTP) real intent of exacting control of the area for political gains was exposed by their words (calling democracy, judiciary and political structure in Pakistan as un-islamic) and deeds (read: blowing up schools, committing murder in cold blood, slitting throats of the innocent civilians and thrashing of children). How can any military/security/political expert ignore the fact that such a massive operation cannot be launched at a day's notice? The whole operation was all drawn out and planned in advance, only the timing was crucial, a week earlier and the Pakistani public consensus would have called it too hasty, a week later and these thugs would have spread even further and had committed even more atrocities.

Mistaking thugs for Pashtuns and vice versa
Another assumption that Mr. Margolis makes is that the army is fighting the 'Pashtuns' as a people. These bandits and murdering terrorists cannot be called humans much less a 'Pashtun'. I am surprised that someone professing to be so learned in the way of the 'Pashtunwali' could equate these animals to the proud and honorable Pashtuns.

Pakhtunkhwah
Yet another assumption is that the people of NWFP want to secede from Pakistan and create a separate Pashtunistan. Please be aware that the correct word/term is 'Pakhtunkhwah'. And that too is exclusively used to indicate the province of NWFP. The legality of the Durand line is another subject needing a long discussion but I find nothing wrong in asking for a nameless area like NWFP (North West Frontier Province) to have a proper name. It's like calling New York TBCOEC (The Big City On the East Coast), I bet the New York natives would have a real issue with the 'I heart TBCOEC' slogan. I think it's time we stop calling people secessionists just because they have a genuine and legitimate demand that counters the outdated, orthodox, colonial, and subjugated mentality of the establishment.

Under duress
If we were to agree with Mr. Margolis that the proud Pashtuns are so averse to dictation and ultimatums then can he also explain how come the same Pashtuns accepted the ultimatum given by the TTP forbidding men to shave or even trim beards? Mr. Margolis is right in one assumption though, the proud Pashtun will not accept ultimatums and hence they have rejected these thugs and they have wholeheartedly accepted the military action against the terrorists. The grievance and resentment towards the army action is due to the civilian casualties (I refuse to call it collateral damage, they are not damaged goods, they are human beings) and the displaced people and the hardships they have to face, which, no matter how unavoidable, are still a tremendous tragedy.

View from the south
As for claiming that the rest of Pakistanis (lowland or otherwise) have no love lost for the Pashtuns, I think this is the most disingenuous statement of this article and puts into doubt your claims of knowing what you are talking about. Pashtuns are no less and no more patriotic Pakistanis than anyone else. I am deeply disturbed by this comment and wish the writer hadn't tried to create divisiveness where none exists.

Yes, the poor and the downtrodden need relief, they need quick and fair justice, they need education, and most of all, they need the security in their daily lives. However, they don't want it at the cost of the Sharia forced on them without their say, the kind of perverted and skewed and selective Sharia that had been meted out to them by the so-called 'Taliban of Pakistan'.